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The paper discusses major implications of high energy physics for the scientific 
realism debate. The first part analyses the ways in which aspects of the empirically 
well-confirmed standard model of particle physics are relevant for a reassessment of 
entity realism, ontological realism and structural realism. The second part looks at 
the implications of more far-reaching concepts like string theory. While those 
theories have not found empirical confirmation, if they turned out viable, their 





The present article discusses the implications of high energy physics for the scientific realism 
debate. The analysis covers developments in fundamental microphysics roughly from the 
1950s onwards. In order to specify those characteristics of high energy physics that set it 
apart from earlier microphysics, let us have a brief look at the state of microphysics around 
1950. Conceptually, microphysics at the time was based on quantum field theory, the special 
relativistic extension of quantum mechanics. The technique of renormalization was turning 
quantum field theory into a workable method of calculating scattering amplitudes at high 
energies. The particle spectrum had just started to transcend the set of stable particles that 
made up macro-physical material objects.   
Two fundamental developments characterize the evolution of high energy physics 
from that time onwards. Experimentally, the search for new unstable types of particles in 
experiments that produced highly energetic collisions of electrons or protons turned out to 
be the most dynamical generator of new developments in microphysics. The production of 
new particles in collider experiments is based on a basic property of special relativity: rest 
mass is understood as a form of energy, which provides a conceptual basis for turning kinetic 
energy into mass energy.  Collision energy on that basis can be used for producing new 
particles. The higher the collision energy, the more massive the particles produced in the 
collision can be. Quantum mechanics then adds a second important ingredient: the 
stochastic nature of quantum mechanics implies that any process that is allowed based on 
the relevant conservation laws happens with a given probability. Therefore, generating a 
certain collision energy is sufficient for creating all particles that can be generated from the 
initial state according to the relevant conservation laws. The build-up of increasingly 
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powerful particle colliders thus allowed for the discovery of a series of new physical particles 
that did not exist under everyday circumstances because i) their generation required higher 
kinetic energy than what was available under standard conditions on earth and ii) once 
generated, they quickly decayed back into the stable constituents of matter.  
The theoretical shift of perspective that complimented the described experimental 
shift happened a little later, from the 1960s onwards. The wealth of new particles at first 
seemed confusing and conceptually arbitrary. In the 1960s, a new perspective emerged that 
related the spectrum of particles directly to fundamental structural characteristics of 
microphysics. Nuclear interactions were now understood as implications of a specific form of 
symmetry: local gauge symmetry. Local gauge symmetries can be understood as a 
reparametrization invariance of a physical theory. One can define an internal space of 
particle degrees of freedom by attributing an additional characteristic property, let us call it 
color, with n possible values, to each fermionic particle of a given type.  At first, no physical 
implication is being attached to the property of having a certain color. The theory then is 
called locally gauge invariant under unitary rotations in the n-dimensional color-space if it is 
possible to define the “color-directions” in internal color-space anew at each point in 
spacetime without changing the theory’s physical implications. As it turns out, most 
quantum field theories that could be constructed in principle aren’t locally gauge invariant. 
The only way to achieve gauge invariance is to introduce vector bosons that couple to the 
fermions in a specific way and in effect play the role of interaction particles (called gauge-
Bosons). We thus have the peculiar situation that the requirement of turning a symmetry 
under the variation of a physically empty property into a local gauge symmetry enforces the 
introduction of a physically very relevant characteristic of the theory, namely a specific form 
of interaction that is based on particle exchange.1  
Gauge symmetries assumed a crucial role in high energy physics for a technical 
reason. Straightforward calculations of cross sections in quantum field theory lead to infinite 
values. Those infinities can be treated in a controlled way that allows for extracting 
predictions if the theory is renormalizable.2 It turns out that the only renormalizable 
interacting theories that include fermions are gauge theories. Gauge symmetry thus plays a 
pivotal role for making high energy physics predictive. As it turns out, gauge symmetry in 
some cases is spontaneously broken, which means that the gauge symmetry transforms 
between physically distinguishable particle types. (This is the case for the gauge group of 
weak interaction and for all possible gauge symmetry structures that reach beyond the 
standard model.)  
The precise role of the property of renormalizability in high energy physics became 
clearer in the early 1970s within the framework of renormalization group methods (Wilson 
1974) and was fully understood in Polchinski (1984). Gauge invariance has also been the first 
topic in high energy physics that was addressed in greater depth by philosophers of science 
(Teller 2000, Healey 2001, 2007, Earman 2002). Since the present article focuses on the 
question of scientific realism, we have to leave those discussions aside. 
                                                          
1
 In the simplest ‘abelian’ case, the gauge transformation is a mere U(1) phase transformations (that is, n=1). 
The standard model of particle physics does contain a U(1) gauge symmetry that roughly corresponds to the 
photon. 




Gauge field theory in conjunction with the discovery that nucleons had constituents 
(the quarks) that were bound together by a specific gauge interaction called the strong 
force, generated an entirely different view on high energy physics. Theory became far more 
predictive than before. The gauge structure to a large degree enforced both the particle 
content and the interaction structure of the world. The vast spectrum of seemingly arbitrary 
elementary objects was replaced by a tightly knit theory-based system of elementary 
particles and interactions that came to be known as the standard model of particle physics. 
Based on a set of empirical data that specified the general structure of the standard model, a 
wide range of predictions could be extracted from the theory and was then, step by step, 
confirmed in collider experiments. Gauge theory inverted the hierarchy between theory and 
experiment. While up to the early 1970s, theory was busy finding conceptual answers to the 
phenomena and empirical anomalies discovered by experiment, no serious anomaly has 
been produced up to this point that contradicted the standard model.3 From the early 1970s 
onwards, experiment thus followed theory, aiming at testing theory’s predictions.   
Theorizing from the mid-1970s onwards was characterized by attempts to develop 
theories beyond the standard model for other reasons than empirical anomalies. One reason 
was to find a coherent theory of gravity and nuclear forces. This was deemed necessary for 
developing a coherent understanding of the very early phases of the universe. The theory 
physicists came up with was string theory. Another reason was to explain conspicuous 
coincidences of measured parameter values. This led to grand unified theories and, in a 
different context, to cosmic inflation. Another theory, supersymmetry, turned out to be 
contained in string theory and to be related to grand unification. It also offered promises for 
explaining a number of other conspicuous aspects of high energy physics. These theories, 
despite remaining empirically unconfirmed or, in the case of inflationary cosmology, 
inconclusively confirmed, to a high degree determine today’s perspective on cosmology and 
the fundamental characteristics of matter. 
 
 
2: A First Take on the General Relevance of HEP for Scientific 
Realism 
In a number of ways, high energy physics has further eroded what had survived of 
the intuitive notion of an ontological object that was badly damaged already by quantum 
physics and quantum field theory. To begin with, many unstable particles generated in 
collider experiments can never be identified individually but only be attributed to an 
individual scattering event measured in a detector with an (often fairly small) probability. At 
a more conceptual level, mass loses its status as a fundamental property of objects and is 
understood in terms of the way fields couple to the vacuum; Hadrons (such as protons and 
neutrons) consist of constituents (the quarks) that cannot be isolated; and the 
characteristics of hadrons are to a large degree determined by field theoretical effects that 
                                                          
3 The only discovery so far that, strictly speaking, transcends the original standard model is the neutrino mass. 
Neutrino masses, however, always seemed natural in a standard model context and were only left out because 
they had not been found in experiment. Experimentalists at CERN hope to find significant deviations from the 
Standard Model at the very time I am writing this text, however. 
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cannot be expressed in terms of the dynamics of their real constituents. (For a philosophical 
discussion of the last points, see Falkenburg (2007). Falkenburg argues that only a 
mereological understanding of the term ‘particle’ survives in a particle physics context.) 
Finally, developments in quantum gravity suggest the dissolution of space-time structure at 
the most fundamental levels of description. 
 All those points seem to disfavor a realist view on high energy physics. But other 
developments in high energy physics may actually be taken to support scientific realism. The 
standard model of particle physics is a prime example of novel predictive success and 
therefore strengthens the basis for no-miracles kinds of reasoning. On a more pragmatic 
note, high energy physics today is a field without any perspectives of technical utilization. 
Experimental data extracted from collider experiments in high energy physics have no 
relevance beyond their role in testing theories. If research in high energy physics was not 
about finding the truth about the world in some sense, little reason remained for being 
interested in its results.  
High energy physics thus is an interesting and multifaceted context for discussing 
scientific realism. While philosophical discussions of the implications of high energy physics 
for the realism debate are still scarce, there are more of them than could reasonably be 




3: High Energy Physics Versus Entity Realism  
Let us first have a look at a form of realism that may expected to be at variance with 
high energy physics. Entity realism (Hacking 1983, Cartwright 1983) offers an approach 
towards scientific realism that avoids the subtleties of theoretical physics and aims at 
grounding realism in the intuitive understanding of experimental procedures. More 
specifically, Ian Hackings experimental realism relies on the observation that physicists treat 
specific objects as tools for probing other aspects of physics. This utilization of physical 
objects, Hacking argues, presupposes the existence of those objects and therefore justifies 
realism with respect to those objects.  
Hacking makes clear that his argument for realism does not justify realism about all 
empirically well confirmed existence claims in microphysics. It is one thing to achieve 
empirical confirmation and another thing to use the corresponding objects as tools for 
probing new physics. It is an interesting question, however, whether any empirically 
confirmed physical object could in principle find a realist interpretation pace experimental 
realism once the right experimental setup has been developed, or whether general 
conceptual arguments enforce limits to the reach of Hacking’s approach.  
 The suspicion that fundamental limits of that kind may exist can be related to one of 
the core criticisms of experimental realism. It has been argued (see e.g. Psillos 1999) that no 
clear-cut distinction between the experimentalist perspective and the corresponding theory 
can be made. Any experimentalist causal story about the use of physical objects as tools 
must be based on theoretical knowledge in order to specify how this tool can be deployed. It 
is plausible to expect that the use of theory in specifying the object within the experimental 
story increases with the conceptual complexity of the theory to be tested. High energy 
physics in this light appears as a prime candidate for a research context where Hacking’s 
ideas make no sense anymore because the theory’s empirical implications can’t be 
formulated in terms of an intuitive experimental story. 
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 A first confrontation of Hacking’s entity realism with high energy physics was carried 
out by Hones (1991), who discusses meson and baryon spectroscopy in the late 1960s. 
Hones comes to the conclusion that, while the use of π-mesons in resonance physics can be 
viewed as a nice example of the use of a particle as a tool, Hacking’s approach only provides 
a very rough view on what is going on in the experiment.   
 Massimi (2004) looks at the testing of the quark hypothesis in the 1970s and comes 
to a more critical conclusion. Massimi chooses a peculiar point of departure. Quarks are 
probed by other particles like electrons, but they are not themselves used as instruments in 
Hacking’s sense. Massimi assumes that the described situation may be sufficient for a 
weakened version of entity realism that relies on being probed rather than on being used as 
an instrument. This idea may seem like a far stretch, given that it destroys Hacking’s key idea 
that manipulation of objects provides a significantly stronger basis for realism than mere 
testing of the object’s properties. Still, let us accept Massimi’s softened criterion for entity 
realism and look at her argument.  
Massimi observes that probing the constituents of nucleons in the 1970s had one 
important goal: deciding whether the quark model, which assumed effects of gluon 
exchange based on a gauge field theoretical understanding of strong interaction, or the 
parton model, which assumed freely moving constituents inside the nucleon, were 
empirically adequate. Eventually, the probing of the constituents of nucleons showed that 
the quark model was viable and the parton model was empirically inadequate. Massimi now 
points out that making this distinction was only possible by taking into account the 
theoretical characteristics of gauge field theory and the theory behind the experimental 
signatures collected. Already the specification of the property of experimental signatures 
that indicates the absence of interaction between constituents of the nucleon, the so called 
‘Bjorken scaling’, is a theoretically difficult concept that can’t be viewed in terms of a simple 
and straightforwardly intuitive experimental story. Matching violations of Bjorken scaling 
with predictions of gauge field theory then requires the full body of gauge theory. A simple 
experimental story cannot describe what is going on in the experiment. As Massimi puts it, 
“at a lower = experimental realist level (i.e., experiments plus phenomenological laws) 
partons and quarks are empirically equivalent. At a higher = scientific realist level (i.e., 
experiments plus QCD theory), partons and quarks are no longer empirically equivalent.” 
Therefore, only the latter level allows us to understand what the experiments that probe the 
constituents of nucleons are all about. In other words, even based on the weakened notion 
of experimental realism Massimi is ready to accept, experimental realism is incapable of 
providing a basis for a realist understanding of quarks. 
 
 
4: Group Structural Realism 
 Contrary to experimental realism, structural realism focuses on the specifics of 
physical theory and is advertised by its exponents to account for the decay of intuitive 
notions of ontology in fundamental physics. In recent years, a number of structural realists 
have put emphasis on the role of internal continuous symmetries and on gauge symmetries 
in high energy physics in particular. The idea that group structure is the most adequate place 
to anchor structural realism about fundamental physical theories has been named ‘group 
structural realism by Brian Roberts (2011).  
In the following, I will focus on internal gauge symmetries, where the case for a 
structural realist understanding arguably is most plausible. As described in Section 1, particle 
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spectra and interaction structures in high energy physics are determined by the 
requirements of gauge invariance. Interactions are based on gauge boson exchange between 
those matter (spin 1/2) particles that form representations of the corresponding gauge 
symmetry group.   
 The crucial role of gauge symmetry lends support to a structural understanding of the 
theory’s core tenets in a fairly straightforward way. While classical theories and quantum 
mechanics are based on the specification of the fundamental building blocks of the world, be 
they particles or fields, to which properties are attributed that determine their dynamics, 
theory construction in the case of gauge field theory may be taken to start at a structural 
level with the specification of the theory’s gauge structure. The particle content then is given 
by a representation of the gauge group and can be extracted in a second step4. Particle 
ontology from that point of view looks secondary to structure. Two authors, Holger Lyre 
(2004) and Aharon Kantorovich (2003, 2009), have tried to make that idea more specific.  
 Lyre (2004) gives three reasons for a primacy of structure.  
1: Viewed in terms of representations of gauge symmetries, particles are no individual 
objects in the sense of observable, identifiable entities that correspond to specific points in 
internal symmetry space. Objects are only defined, as Lyre puts it, “as members of 
equivalence classes under symmetry transformations”. This suggests, according to Lyre, that 
objects are strictly secondary to the symmetry structure within which they are embedded. 
2: The nature of ontological commitments in quantum field theory is underdetermined. 
Ontology may be based on field strengths, on potentials, or even on holonomies5 (closed 
curves characterising the connection of a manifold). The symmetry statement, however, is 
unaffected by that choice and therefore seems to allow a unique expression of ontic 
commitment. (Lyre makes the additional point that, if the holonomy interpretation 
eventually turned out to be preferable, this would also support a structural perspective on 
realism because the nonlocal character of holonomies is at variance with an interpretation in 
terms of localized fundamental objects). 
3: Lyre thinks that, in high energy physics, statements on symmetry structure have proved 
more stable than claims about ontological objects. This, of course, would play squarely into 
Worrall’s classic argument that choosing the structural level for realist claims avoids the 
pitfalls of the pessimistic meta-induction. 
 Lyre argues that all three arguments favor gauge symmetry as the natural candidate 
for a structurally realist commitment. 
 Kantorovich chooses a substantially different perspective on the issue. His starting 
point is the mindset behind the ontological realist’s focus on objects. This focus, in 
Kantorovich’s view, is rooted in the following line of reasoning: while it is doubtful at best 
whether relations can be specified in a meaningful way without relata, physics can be fully 
understood in terms of actual micro-objects, the properties of which determine their 
dynamics; therefore, it seems plausible to attribute the ontological primacy to objects. 
                                                          
4
 In the standard model, elementary particles are all attributed to the fundamental representations of the 
simple gauge groups and therefore seem to be implied immediately by the group choice. In grand unified 
theories, however, this is not the case, which in a sense emancipates the choice of the particle spectrum from 
the choice of the gauge group. This may be seen as a first worry about group structural realism. 
5
 see Healey (2007) 
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 This understanding, Kantorovich points out, is not applicable any more in the context 
of quantum field theory. One core implication of quantum field theory is the generation of 
new types of particles from radiation or kinetic energy. The particles that can be generated 
are determined by the corresponding theory’s gauge structure and the representations that 
are physically realized. As described in Section 1, the possible outcomes of a particle collision 
in a high energy physics collider experiment are not fully determined by the incoming 
particles but depend on the internal symmetry structure and the conservation laws that 
characterize ‘the world’. Those characteristics of ‘the world’ are not attributable to any 
objects existing at the initial stage of the collision process. Gauge structure is not a 
characteristic of existing objects but a feature ‘globally’ attributable to the world. Even if not 
a single particle of a given type existed a given point in time, the gauge structure would still 
imply that its creation was possible. In this sense, Kantorovich claims, structure is primary 
and ontological objects are secondary.    
 Let me point at an interesting general aspect of group structural realism. Scientific 
realism amounts to the claim that mature scientific theories are typically approximately true. 
In ontological realism, this claim is usually connected to the notion that scientific objects 
refer to something in the external world. Since ontological objects are not available as 
natural referents in structural realism, the question arises whether and if so in which way it 
makes sense to keep up the definition of scientific realism in terms of reference to 
something in the external world at all. The question may be phrased in terms of the 
distinction between placing realist commitments at a type or at a token level. In ontological 
realism, reference to the external world is understood at a token level: the term electron 
refers if it can be related to tokens of electrons in the external world. Structural realism, 
both in its epistemic and its ontic form, deemphasizes the token level of analysis compared 
to the type level.  
 It is a striking feature of group structural realism about high energy physics that its 
realist commitment is very difficult to express at a token level at all. The internal gauge 
symmetry structure is attributed to the Lagrangian of a given theory. It cannot be expressed 
as a property or characteristic of an individual object or phenomenon in the external world. 
One does not find tokens of gauge symmetry in this world. This aspect of the role of gauge 
symmetry in high energy physics is implicit in Lyre’s analysis. For Kantorovich, the pre-
eminence of structural features that are expressible only at the type level is the central 
reason for endorsing a structuralist position. 
 Group structural realism has been criticized on two accounts. It has been pointed out 
(McKenzie 2013, see also Nounou 2015) that mathematical group structure in itself does not 
amount to any physical claim. The parameters characterizing particles that sit in the 
representations of a gauge group need to be interpreted physically, that is in terms of their 
role in the dynamics of individual objects in order to acquire physical meaning. Only based 
on those specifications, which correspond to specifying a particle in terms of its position in a 
specific representation of the (spontaneously broken) symmetry group, can gauge field 
theory play the role of a physical theory that has the rich spectrum of empirical implications 
we know. In this light, the primacy of group structure, though plausible in terms of 
important mathematical features of the theory, looks less natural once one starts viewing 
the theory in terms of its physical import. (One might add that a theory’s empirical import 
plays a crucial role in the no miracles argument, a main argument in favor of scientific 
realism.)   
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Kantorovich’s position is less affected by this line of criticism. His main argument, 
stating that the theory describes more than actual objects, plays out once the physics behind 
the group structure has been fully taken into account. 
 A different line of criticism has been put forward in Roberts (2011).  Roberts points 
out that it is highly non-trivial to specify what is meant by real structure in the context of 
group structural realism. The problem is that symmetry groups themselves can be 
characterized in terms of their symmetry structure. Technically this is done based on what is 
called the automorphism group of a given symmetry group. Repeating the step from a group 
to its automorphism group can lead to an infinite tower of meta-structural characterizations. 
The group structural realist thus faces the task of specifying which level(s) of structural 
description she wants to understand realistically, and for what reason. This, in Roberts’ view 
makes the enterprise of specifying real structure uncomfortably arbitrary. Roberts adds that 
the argument from higher stability of structure (Lyre’s third argument) might actually exert 
pressure towards shifting the realist understanding to higher level structures, since different 
groups can have the same automorphism group, which renders the latter potentially more 
stable under theory change than the former.    
There is also a more general problem with Lyre’s third argument. Lyre argues that 
symmetry statements are less prone to being superseded at future stages of theory building 
than other claims that are more closely bound to a given ontology. The problem is that 
Lyre’s claim is itself bound to a given state of high energy physics theory building and 
therefore looks dangerously ahistoric. It is difficult to predict whether or not the 
fundamental role that has been attributed to gauge symmetry during the last half a century 
will be the final verdict in high energy physics. In fact, Joseph Polchinski has speculated in 
(2015) that gauge symmetry might in the end turn out to be an effective phenomenon that 
does not exist at the most fundamental level.  
 To conclude, whether or not full-fledged ontic structural realism follows from high 
energy physics remains contentious. Lyre and Kantorovich do deserve credit, however, for 
having highlighted a number of aspects of high energy physics that significantly reduce the 
role of ontological objects.   
 
 
3: Realism and Non-Empirical Confirmation 
 
The previous section was focused on analyzing the standard model of high energy physics, 
which is an empirically well confirmed theory. However, high energy physics today is 
characterized by a particularly important role of theories that have not found empirical 
confirmation. In fact, no fundamental theory in high energy physics that has been developed 
since 1974 has found empirical confirmation up to this point. Despite the lack of empirical 
confirmation, theories like grand unified theories, supersymmetry, supergravity and string 
theory have played a pre-eminent role in the field for many years. In this light, if one wants 
to discuss philosophical implications of recent concepts in the field, one needs to discuss 
empirically unconfirmed theories. 
But does it make sense to take those theories seriously with regard to their 
implications for the scientific realism debate? Interestingly, important empirically 
unconfirmed theories are quite strongly believed to be viable by their exponents despite the 
lack of empirical confirmation. The degree of trust many physicists have in their theories is at 
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variance with the canonical understanding of theory assessment and confirmation. It was 
argued in Dawid (2013) that, for a number of reasons, it seems advisable to modify that 
canonical understanding in a way that accounts for the actual status of today’s empirically 
unconfirmed theories in the eyes of their exponents. Others (see e.g. Ellis and Silk 2014) 
have spoken out against taking empirically unconfirmed theories overly seriously.  
Even if one does not endorse an extension of the concept of theory confirmation 
along the lines suggested in (Dawid 2013), it arguably makes sense to take well accepted but 
empirically unconfirmed theories seriously from a realist perspective. According to the 
canonical understanding of scientific theory confirmation, confirmation must be based on 
empirical data predicted by the theory in question. Arguing for epistemic scientific realism, 
however, requires going beyond this set of empirical evidence. It relies on the understanding 
that there is something in the record of doing science that suggests a specific relation 
between (some of) our scientific theories and truth. Arguing for realism with respect to a 
scientific theory therefore crucially relies on the understanding that considerations reaching 
out beyond empirical confirmation do have epistemic value. But that very understanding 
also constitutes the basis for the trust physicists have in empirically unconfirmed theories. 
Scientific realism thus naturally opens up to the question as to how it is affected by theories 





4: String Dualities 
 
Among the empirically unconfirmed theories that have been developed in high energy 
physics during the last four decades, string theory is the most influential one. It aims at 
providing a unified description of all fundamental interactions based on the basic idea that 
elementary objects are not point-like but extended in one dimension. The length of those 
strings is assumed to be far too small for being observable by current experimental methods.  
 Two characteristics of string theory arguably constitute high energy physics’ most 
substantial novel contributions to the realism debate. The first of those characteristics is the 
abundance of duality relations in the theory. In order to understand the point, we need to 
say a few words about the basics of string theory. String theory contains no free parameters. 
This means that the theory does not allow for parameter values that can be chosen freely at 
a fundamental level. However, according to the best current understanding, the theory does 
have a very large number of ground states that correspond to specific parameter values that 
characterize the actual form of the string theoretical structure on which the world we 
observe is based. Parameters of that kind are, for example, the string coupling or the radii of 
string theory’s compact dimensions. (Superstring theory, the kind of string theory that 
describes bosons and fermions, must have 10 spacetime dimensions to be consistent. 6 of 
them are assumed to be compact, that is they run back into themselves like a cylinder 
surface with a very small radius.) Which of those groundstates is actually selected is a matter 
of the dynamics of the system. Since string theory is a quantum theory, the choice of its 
groundstate is driven by quantum statistics.  
At a fundamental level, it was initially believed that one could construct 5 different 
types of superstring theory. In the mid-1990s, it turned out that those 5 types of string 
theory were in fact only different descriptions of the same theory that were related to each 
other by so called duality relations. A duality connects two seemingly very different theories 
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that, though being constructed based on different kinds of elementary objects, describe 
identical observable phenomena. In the case of the 5 seemingly different types of string 
theory, these theories are based on different internal symmetry structures and different 
spacetime structures. They also involve higher dimensional objects (so-called D-branes) of 
different dimensions. If two theories are dual, one theory with a specific parameter value 
(corresponding to a specific groundstate of the fundamental theory) is empirically fully 
equivalent to the dual theory with the inverted parameter value. Parameter values can for 
example be the string coupling constant (in the case of S-duality) or radii of compact 
dimensions measured in unities of the string length (in the case of T-duality). S- and T-duality 
connect all five types of string theory plus an additional 11-dimensional theory called M-
theory. This means that, via a series of duality transformations, one can get from any type of 
string theory to any other. 
The inversion of parameter values from one theory to its dual implies that there will 
often be one ‘natural’ formulation while the dual one will be less handy. For example, if one 
theory contains a compact dimension much larger than the string length, this dimension 
behaves in the way we expect a spatial dimension to behave. The extra-dimension of the 
dual theory, being much smaller than the string length, is in some sense too small for having 
the known characteristics of an extended dimension in which particles propagate. This 
means that it makes sense to discuss the first theory if we want to make contact with the 
dynamics of our observed world.   
It may also happen, however, that the parameter values of the theory and its dual 
are both close to one, which means that no theory looks more natural than the other.  
In 1998 it was understood by Maldacena (1998) that duality relations even reach out 
beyond string theory proper.  String theory with a specific spacetime structure (asymptotic 
anti de Sitter Space) is conjectured to be empirically equivalent to a specific form of gauge 
field theory (a conformal field theory) that is based on point-like objects and does not 
contain a gravitational interaction.  
Duality relations create serious problems for the ontological realist. Ontological 
realism is based on the understanding that there exists a set of real objects the world 
consists of. As has been discussed in a number of papers (Dawid 2007 and 2013, Rickles 
2011, Matsubara 2013), this seems irreconcilable with the phenomenon of string dualities. A 
theory that contains duality relations which connect substantially different ontologies 
cannot be committed to one real set of ontological objects.  
A metaphysical realist might hope to declare one of the dual ontologies the real one, 
even in the absence of an empirical way of identifying the true ontology. But this move is 
incompatible with the character of string physics for a number of reasons. First and 
foremost, string theory cannot be fully understood, let alone calculated, within the 
framework of one of the dual theories. The entire web of dual theories is needed in order to 
understand the theory’s overall structure. And the theory’s overall structure, in turn, is 
necessary for understanding the dynamics that leads towards the selection of a specific 
string theory groundstate. Focusing on just one type of string theory as the real one thus 
makes no conceptual sense.  
Second, as has been pointed out e.g. in (Polchinski 2015), the limits in which one 
theory is more ‘natural’ than its dual correspond to classical limits: close to those limits, 
quantum effects are small. Those parts of parameter space where none of the dual theories 
is preferred correspond to physical situations that are dominated by quantum effects. The 
implication of this understanding is the following. The adequacy of a specific ontology must 
be understood as a property of a specific classical limit of the theory rather than of the 
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theory itself. The existence of several types of string theory that are related to each other by 
duality relations demonstrates that string theory has several classical limits. Away from the 
classical limits of the theory, there is no way of making sense of any ontological formulation 
of the theory. It may well be the case that the actual string theory ground-state that 
corresponds to the world we live in is close to one of the classical limits. The full theory, 
however, and thereby the dynamics that has led to the selection of that groundstate, cannot 
be understood just by discussing the corresponding limit. Therefore, ontological scientific 
realism is no adequate basis for characterizing string theory at a fundamental level. If string 
theory is viable, ontological scientific realism as a fundamental perspective on physics is 
dead. 
How structural realism fares in the face of string and string/gauge dualities is a more 
complicated question. String dualities imply that there is no fundamental structure that can 
be attributed to a given spacetime region.  Dualities connect very different fundamental 
structures that can be used to characterize the situation; and spacetime structure itself 
changes from a theory to its dual. In this light, structural realism only seems compatible with 
string dualities if understood in a way that is fully decoupled from the notion of embedding 
structure in spacetime. It must allow for taking the overall structure of string physics, 
including the body of gauge theoretical structures that is connected to string theory by 
gauge/gravity dualities, as the true structure without referring to any spacetime background.  
The strong role of dualities in string physics also has a more general implication for 
the realism debate. We observe two novel characteristics of theory building. First, in order 
to acquire a full understanding of the theory, it seems necessary to consider the entire web 
of dual formulations. Second, full empirical equivalence turns into an issue that is mostly 
discussed in terms of duality relations. In conjunction, those two observations imply that 
empirical equivalence is mostly viewed as an inner-theoretical issue rather than an issue of 
comparing different theories. On this basis, string physics de-emphasizes the distinction 
between truth and empirical adequacy. If understanding a theory means understanding how 
the empirically equivalent approaches that can be developed are related to each other, the 
truth of a theory refers to the entire spectrum of such empirically equivalent approaches. It 
wouldn’t make sense to interpret empirical confirmation of string theory – if it occurred - as 
indicating that one of the empirically equivalent formulations is true. If one wants to call 
string theory true, one has to assert the truth of the entire web of dual formulations. 
 
 
5: Final Theory Claims 
Vague forms of final theory claims appeared in physics at various stages. Throughout most of 
the 18th and 19th century Newtonian physics was, except for the issue of its most convenient 
formulation, taken to be the last word on the physical phenomena described on its basis. In 
the late 19th century, a number of physicists thought that the fundamental pillars of physics 
had been provided by Newton and Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism. The advent of 
quantum mechanics and general relativity changed all this. It was understood that even the 
most successful theories could eventually turn out deeply inadequate at a fundamental 
level. Moreover, the understanding emerged that the conceptual incompatibility between 
the two grand physical frameworks of quantum physics and general relativity most likely 
would have to be overcome by further deep conceptual changes. The example of the 
supersession of even the most cherished classical theories by the conceptually very different 
successor theories quantum mechanics and general relativity seemed to suggest a 
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perspective of infinite theory succession that played an important role in establishing 
antirealist perspectives among many philosophers of science once the scientific realism 
debate took center stage in the philosophy of science in the 1970s and 1980s. 
String Theory is considered a promising candidate for a theory that unifies nuclear 
interactions and gravity. Therefore, it is a universal theory of all interactions, which makes it 
a candidate for a final theory. In this sense, it reconnects to the question of finality as it was 
raised in the 19th century. But in two respects string theory provides a qualitatively much 
stronger final theory claim than its classical forbears ever could. First, string theory cannot 
be combined in a consistent way with additional theories that describe additional 
phenomena. It is not possible to treat it in the way Newtonian mechanics was treated when 
electromagnetic phenomena were described independently but without generating any 
incoherence with the former. If a phenomenon that is not covered by string theory were 
discovered at energy scales below the string scale, the entire theory would have to be 
discarded. Second, and even more significantly, string theory introduces a minimal length 
scale based on its duality structure. It turns out that every formulation of string theory that 
introduces length scales below the string length can also be expressed in terms of the 
inverse length scale (in units of the string length). Therefore, once the entire 
phenomenology of string theory down to the string length has been specified, all has been 
said about the system. (see e.g. Witten 1996). On that basis, string theory suggests that no 
new physics should occur at all that goes beyond string theory. These two implications of 
string theory for the first time in the history of physics generate an explicit final theory claim 
based on a theory’s structure: if string theory is viable, nothing can be added to it and no 
new physics can arise beyond its own characteristic scale. 
The status of these claims has been analyzed in Dawid (2013,2013a). Theory-based 
final theory claims, if naively understood, seem to be begging the question. In effect, they 
amount to the claim that the theory is final if all its implications are true. But whether or not 
all implications of the theory are true is exactly what is at issue when a final theory claim is 
raised. So what can be the significance of string theory’s final theory claim?  Dawid (2013, 
2013a) argues that a theory-based final theory claim can be relevant in connection with 
other strategies that aim at understanding the possible alternatives to a given theory. Since 
those other strategies also play an important role in assessing the current status of string 
theory, it is argued that string theory’s final theory claim is a substantial, though not a 
conclusive statement.  
A substantial final theory claim obviously is of high significance for the scientific 
realism debate. Note that the way the final theory claim is argued for in string physics only 
asserts the full empirical adequacy of the theory. It does not explicitly address the question 
of truth. However, we have argued in the previous section that string dualities suggest a 
conflation of the question of empirical equivalence and the question of truth. On that basis, 
string theory’s final theory claim can be understood in terms of the theory’s absolute truth. 
It must be emphasized, though, that string theory has not found a complete formulation yet. 
It rather resembles a number of statements that are deduced from a set of fundamental 
posits. The final theory claim should be read as the claim that there is a way to turn that set 
of statements into a complete theory based on consistency arguments. The resulting theory, 
whatever it is, is conjectured to be a true description of the world.  
In this sense, string theory in conjunction with its final theory claim implies a realist 
interpretation. However, due to the conflation of truth and empirical adequacy and the lack 
of any ontological interpretation of the theory’s claims, the emerging kind of realism 
remains fairly weak. On what grounds does it deserve to be called realism at all? Dawid 
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(2013, Chapter 7) proposes a formulation of scientific realism that characterizes the status of 
string theory (if confirmed) in conjunction with a final theory claim. This position, presented 
under the name of consistent structure realism, identifies as the substance of the realist 
conjecture in the given context the claim that there is a level of description of empirical 
phenomena that lies below mere bookkeeping of empirical data and that reduces the 
number of possible alternatives, based on a given set of empirical data, to one. The realist 
commitment then amounts to the understanding that, due to the lack of possible 





If we try to distill a common message from the lines of reasoning presented in this paper, it 
may be the following. High energy physics continues and intensifies the development 
already discernible in quantum physics and general relativity towards a decay of the intuitive 
foundations of ontological realism and related concepts like entity realism. Developments in 
high energy physics can only be grasped from a theoretical point of view, which renders 
entity realism inadequate for dealing with it. They are based on abstract mathematical 
concepts that become increasingly difficult to frame in terms of a realist ontology of objects.  
Some crucial concepts seem to have no convincing interpretation at a token level at all.  
The character of contemporary high energy physics in conjunction with the general 
mindset behind a realist view on science strongly suggest to treat those approaches in high 
energy physics that strongly influence the physical world view despite the lack of empirical 
confirmation as a serious source of arguments in the realism debate. If one follows that 
strategy, arguments against ontological realism become even more cogent. Sting dualities 
look like the final nail in the coffin of ontological realism. On the other hand, final theory 
claims do suggest a weak form of scientific realism that focuses on the issues of truth and 
the lack of scientific alternatives without adhering to traditional views about ontological 
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